Privacy of users in Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks goes far beyond their current usage and is a fundamental requirement to the adoption of P2P protocols for legal usage. In a climate of cold war between P2P filesharing users and anti-piracy groups, more and more users are moving to anonymizing networks in an attempt to hide their identity. However, when not designed to protect users information, a P2P protocol often leaks information that compromises the identity of its users.
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BitTorrent is a P2P filesharing protocol that is daily used by millions of users but that has not been designed to protect the anonymity of its users. Indeed, it has recently been shown that an adversary can continuously spy, i.e., collect the IP-to-contents mapping, on most BitTorrent users of the Internet and from a single machine [1] . In addition to spy on BitTorrent users, an attacker might be able to exploit BitTorrent control messages to de-anonymize a user behind an anonymizing network such as Tor.
Tor relies on onion routing over an overlay network maintained by volunteers to anonymize TCP applications such as web browsing, P2P filesharing, etc. To reach the Internet via Tor, an application selects 3 Tor nodes at random and then first encrypts its messages with the key shared with the last node (exit node), then with the key of the 2nd node, and finally with the key of the 1st node. The 3 Tor nodes that route a user's messages form a circuit and all TCP streams created by that user during a 10-minutes period will be multiplexed into one, or a few circuits. Each Tor node in a circuit then decrypts/encrypts the messages after routing them to/from the Internet. Onion routing thus guarantees that no Tor node knows both the source IP address and the payload of a message.
A BitTorrent user may use Tor to (1) connect to a server (tracker) to collect lists of peers sharing a file, (2) connect to other peers to distribute a file, or (3) both.
In this proposal, we instrument 6 exit nodes for a period of 23 days to demonstrate that an attacker can deanonymize BitTorrent users for any of the 3 aforementioned usages by volunteering to maintain an exit node and eavesdropping appropriate BitTorrent control messages. In addition, as all streams are multiplexed into the same circuit, we show that de-anonymizing one Bit- * Poster NSDI'10, San Jose, CA, April 28-30, 2010. The two first authors contributed equally to this work Torrent stream allows to potentially de-anonymize other applications such as web browsing. We propose 3 attacks to de-anonymize BitTorrent users on Tor.
Our first attack consists in inspecting the payload of some BitTorrent control messages and search for the public IP address of a user. In particular, the announce messages that a client sends to the tracker to collect a list of peers distributing a content, and the extended handshake messages that some clients send right after the application handshake sometimes contain the public IP address of the user. However, we have not tested the accuracy of the public IP address contained in those messages so we do not consider them in the following.
Our second attack consists in rewriting the list of peers returned by the tracker to include the IP address of a peer that we control. As the user will then directly connect to the peer controlled by the attacker, the latter can de-anonymize the user by inspecting the IP header. Whereas this hijacking attack is accurate, it only works when the user relies on Tor only to connect to the tracker.
Finally, the third attack consists in exploiting the DHT to search for the public IP address of a user. Indeed, whereas Tor does not support UDP, BitTorrent's DHT uses UDP for transport and when a BitTorrent client fails to contact the DHT using its Tor interface, it reverts to its public interface hence publishing its public IP address into the DHT. As the content identifier and the port number of a client transit through the exit node, and port numbers are uniformly distributed, an attacker can use this information to identify a BitTorrent user in the DHT. This DHT attack is very accurate and works even when the peer uses Tor to connect to other peers.
Using the hijacking and DHT attacks, we deanonymized and profiled close to 9, 000 public IP addresses of BitTorrent users on Tor. In particular, we have exploited the multiplexing of streams from different applications into the same circuit to profile the web browsing habits of the BitTorrent users on Tor.
